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A Review of the Treatment of the Per se
Rule by the U.S. Supreme Court Over the
Last Twenty-Five Years: A Response to
Albert Gourley's Proposal to Add a Per se
Rule to Canada's Competition Law
Jeffery M. Cross*

In response to a request by the Canadian Bureau of
Competition in June 2001, Albert Gourley of the Toronto office of
Macleod Dixon proposed an innovative and thoughtful approach to
modifying Section 45 of the Canadian Competition Act.' One of the
components of Mr. Gourley's proposal is to create a per se rule to
identify unlawful conduct. If a person is found to have entered into an
agreement or arrangement with another person for the purpose or
effect of fixing prices, eliminating or restricting output, or allocatin8
markets, among other things, that person would be guilty of a crime.
* Jeffrey

Cross is a partner in the Chicago law firm of Freeborn & Peters,
where he practices antitrust law and business litigation. He also is an Adjunct
Professor at John Marshall Law School in Chicago, where he teaches antitrust law.
1 Albert C. Gourley, A Report on Canada'sConspiracy Laws: 1889-2001 and
Beyond, August 2001, available at http://strategis.ic.gc.calpics/ctgourleyrep.pdf
[hereinafter Gourley Report] (last visited Mar. 1, 2002).
2 Section 45(1) of the draft code proposed by Mr. Gourley reads as follows:
Every one who enters into an agreement or arrangement with one
or more other persons for the purpose or having the effect of:
(a) fixing, stabilizing or otherwise affecting prices in or of a
market,
(b) eliminating or restricting capacity, output or supply in, of or to
a market,
(c) impeding expansion or entry in, of or into a market, or
(d) allocating, ceasing to supply or purchase, or otherwise affecting
relations of either or any of them with one or more of any of their
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This would be a per se approach to adjudicating business behavior
because liability hinges solely upon a determination of whether the
actor's conduct falls within certain defined categories, not whether
there is an impact on competition. 3 This approach would replace the
current Canadian Competition Act which is essentially a Rule of
Reason standard. The current Competition Act requires that all
restraints be found to "restrain or injure competition unduly." 4
There is a great deal of discussion today among antitrust and
competition law specialists about the need for convergence of the
world's antitrust laws. Such convergence would enable transnational
corporations to do business more efficiently across many borders
without the constrictions of different and perhaps conflicting
competition laws. Antitrust law in the United States, of course, has
had a per se rule since the 1897 Supreme Court decision in United
States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n. 5 However, over the last
customers in, or suppliers to, a market, where those persons or their
affiliates, or two or more of them, compete in the market, is guilty of an
indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding
five years or to a fine not exceeding [x] or to both.
Gourley Report, supra note 1, at app. 2.
3 Mr. Gourley's proposal has two other major components: (1) to exempt from
condemnation under the Act restraints that are ancillary to an agreement or
arrangement whose predominant purpose is the achieve efficiencies, and (2) to
subject to government review and regulation conduct that falls between that which
is condemned as per se and that which is exempted.
4 Currently, Section 45(1) of the Canadian Competition Act states:
Every one who conspires, combines, agrees or arranges with
another person
(a) to limit unduly the facilities for transporting, producing,
manufacturing, supplying, storing or dealing in any product,
(b) to prevent, limit or lessen, unduly, the manufacture or
production of a product or to enhance unreasonably the price thereof,
(c) to prevent or lessen, unduly, competition in the production,
manufacture, purchase, barter, sale, storage, rental, transportation or
supply of a product, or in the price of insurance on persons or property,
or
(d) to otherwise restrain or injure competition unduly, is guilty of
an indictable offense and liable to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding five years or to a fine not exceeding ten million dollars or
both;
Competition Act, R.S.C. Ch. C-34, § 45(1) (2001) (Can.).
5 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
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twenty-five years, the trend in the United States Supreme Court has
been to narrow and refine the range of conduct subject to the per se
rule. In evaluating the changes proposed by Mr. Gourley to the
Canadian Competition Act, it is valuable to consider the treatment of
the per se rule by the United States Supreme Court during this period
and particularly the Court's rationale for adopting one mode of
analysis over the other.
The scope of the language of Section 1 of the Sherman Act is
very broad. It simply says that "every contract, combination... or
conspiracy in restraint of trade.. .is illegal." 6 For the last 112 years,
the Sherman Act has been molded and shaped almost solely by
judicial construction. Indeed, Congress and the original sponsors of
the Sherman Act recognized that there would have to be judicial
construction of the statute. 7 Consequently, antitrust jurisprudence in
the United States has been a very dynamic and evolving law and is
antithetical to the draft code proposed by Mr. Gourley.
For much of this 112-year period, the treatment of the per se
rule and the Rule of Reason gave the appearance that the two
methodologies were finite in their application and definition. The
hallmark of the per se rule in the United States during the first twothirds of this period was similar to that proposed by Mr. Gourley in
his draft code. The court would determine whether the defendant's
conduct fit into definable categories. Such a method of analysis was
justified by the Supreme Court as being less expensive and less time
consuming than an elaborate inquiry into the reasonableness of the
business practice typically called for under the Rule of Reason. 8 It
was also justified because the Court felt that the judiciary lacked
9
expertise in understanding the dynamics of the market place.
Moreover, the per se rule was seen as providing more certainty and

6

15 U.S.C. § 1 (2001).

7 For an interesting and thought-provoking analysis of the historical
foundations of the Sherman Act, see ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX:
A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 15-71 (Basic Books 1978).
8 Ariz. v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982)
(citing N.
Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) ("The elaborate inquiry into the
reasonableness of a challenged business practice entails significant costs. Litigation
of the effect or purpose of a practice often is extensive and complex.")).

9 Maricopa County, 457 U.S. at 343 (citing United States v. Topco Assocs.,
Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609-10 (1972) ("Judges often lack the expert understanding of
industrial market structures and behavior to determine with any confidence a
practice's effect on competition.")).

Loyola Consumer Law Review

[Vol. 14: 593

guidance to businesses. 10
The Court, however, expressly recognized that the result of
such a regime might be to condemn conduct in error. Conduct found
unlawful under a per se rule might be found lawful if it had been
fully analyzed under the Rule of Reason." However, during most of
this period, the Court expressly found such possibility of error to be
tolerable in light of the efficiencies and certainties of a per se rule.
Over the last twenty-five years, the Supreme Court, as well as
the lower courts, economists and academicians, have become more
concerned with this possibility of error. 12 There has been a
heightened concern about condemning conduct that a fuller, more
sophisticated analysis would find pro-competitive. There also has
been concern that such an application of the antitrust laws itself may
have been stifling competition as measured in terms of consumer
welfare. This recognition is perhaps the most important contribution
of the so-called Chicago School of antitrust jurisprudence.
One of the earliest cases during this twenty-five year period
that recognized these issues was Continental TV., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc. 13 GTE Sylvania was truly a watershed of antitrust
thinking in the United States. The Court reiterated the principle that
the Rule of Reason should be the standard mode of analysis and
enunciated the equally important idea that any departure from the
economic effects
Rule of Reason should be based upon demonstrable
14
rather than merely "formalistic line drawing.'
The problem with such formalistic line drawing is that a court
may end up committing error and condemning pro-competitive
conduct under the guise of per se certainty and ease of decision
making. The GTE Sylvania case involved restraints on intrabrand
competition imposed by GTE Sylvania on its dealers in the form of a
location clause that prevented competition between retailers of the

10 Maricopa County, 457

U.S. at 343-44.

1"Id. at 344 ("As in every rule of general application, the match between the
presumed and the actual is imperfect. For the sake of business certainty and
litigation efficiency, we have tolerated the invalidation of some agreements that a
fullblown inquiry might have proved to be reasonable.") (footnote omitted).
12 Id. at 343-44.
433 U.S. 36 (1977).
14 Id. at 58-59 ("[W]e do make clear that departure from the rule-of-reason
standard must be based on demonstrable economic effect rather than.. upon
formalistic line drawing.").
13
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Sylvania brand of television sets. 15 The Court concluded that such
intrabrand restraints could actually stimulate interbrand competition
between the retailers of different manufacturers. 1 6 Given this
stimulation of interbrand competition, condemning such conduct
because it potentially fit into a per se unlawful category of restraint
would commit error and diminish consumer welfare.'
Two years later in 1979, the Supreme Court handed down an
equally important opinion, Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. (hereinafter "BMr'), which involved
copyright music licensing associations.' 8 Owners of copyrighted
music had banded together to form associations to police copyright
violations and to license the sale of copyrighted music to entities such
as television stations. 19 The associations decided to sell a blanket
license pursuant to which users such as CBS could own the entire
repertoire for a single fee. 20 The associations, of course, had to
establish a price for this blanket license. 21 The Court recognized that
such conduct was literally price fixing, which classically has been
considered to be one of the categories condemned under the per se
rule.22 The Supreme Court in BMI, however, rejected the literal
approach as insufficient by itself in establishing whether the conduct
was one of those categories that should be treated as a violation of the
antitrust laws. 23 The Court stated, for example, that not all
arrangements between actual or potential competitors that have an
laws or even
impact on price are per
24 se violations of the antitrust
unreasonable restraints.

"5 Id. at 43-44.
16 Id. at 54-55.
17

Id. at 58-59.

18

Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).

19

Id. at 4-6.

20

id.

21

id.

22

Id. at 8.

23

Id. at 9 ("'[Plrice fixing' is a shorthand way of describing certain categories

of business behavior to which the per se rule has been held applicable. The.. .literal
approach does not alone establish that this particular practice is one of those types
or that it is 'plainly anticompetitive' and very likely without 'redeeming virtue.'
Literalness is overly simplistic and often overbroad.").
24

Id. at 23.
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One of the important ideas that the Supreme Court recognized
in the BMI case was that experience with a particular challenged
practice should be an important part of determining the particular
methodology to apply. In other words, if the courts do not have
experience in a particular industry or the application of a particular
restraint to an industry, they should be very cautious about adopting a
per se approach. In noting that it had never examined a blanket
license like the one before it, the Supreme Court stated: "[I]t is only
after considerable experience with certain business relationships that
courts classify them as per se violations .... *25
In 1984, the Supreme Court decided NCAA v. Board of
Regents of University of Oklahoma.26 NCAA involved horizontal
agreements among actual or potential competitors to restrict output.
Colleges and universities were viewed as competitors for lucrative
contracts for televising college football. The NCAA was an
association of such competing colleges and universities that imposed
restrictions on the total number of televised intercollegiate games and
the number of games any one team could play.27 The Court
recognized that the restraint was of the type often held unreasonable
as a matter of law before - in other words, a per se restraint. 28 Yet the
Supreme Court treated that case under the Rule of Reason. The Court
recognized that some form of horizontal output restraint among
competitors was necessary for the product,
intercollegiate football, to
29
instance.
first
the
in
market
the
to
come
The Supreme Court in NCAA also recognized that the per se
rule and the Rule of Reason are not as concrete and finite in their
application as they might appear to be. Indeed, it found that the
application of the per se rule may require more than just identifying
that the challenged conduct fit into a category that had been
previously condemned. 30 Rather, the Court found that there may have
to be considerable inquiry into market conditions before the per se
rule could be applied. In this regard, the Court stated "there is often

25 BMI, 441

U.S. at 9.

26

468 U.S. 85 (1984).

27

Id. at 94.

28

Id. at 99.

Id. at 101 ("[W]hat is critical is that this case involves an industry in which
horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at
29

all.").
30 Id. at 103-04.
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no bright line separating per se from Rule of Reason analysis. Per se
rules may require considerable inquiry into market conditions before
31
the evidence justifies a presumption of anticompetitive conduct."
Two years later, the Supreme Court unanimously decided
32
FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists. A group of competing
dentists in southern Indiana agreed among themselves that they
would not provide x-rays to health maintenance organizations who
wanted to use them to determine whether adequate care was being
given. 33 This was clearly a horizontal agreement among competitors
to restrict output, or refuse to deal. Traditionally, such conduct had
been condemned under the per se rule. Yet once again, the Court
applied the Rule of Reason. In doing so, the Court indicated that it
should be slow to condemn conduct as a per se violation of the
antitrust laws if it is conduct of professional associations or if the
conduct imposes a restraint in the context
35 of a business relationship
uncertain.
is
impact
economic
the
where
The Supreme Court also addressed its concern about
committing error through "formalistic line drawing" in two important
36
vertical cases. One was Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.
This case involved vertical resale price maintenance, traditionally
condemned under per se rules. Monsanto had terminated a pricecutting dealer based upon complaints from other, competing
dealers. 37 The Court recognized, however, that the economic effects
of some conduct traditionally condemned as an antitrust violation
may be the same as conduct found to be pro-competitive. 38 For
example, the Court recognized that the economic effect of unilateral
price restraints imposed by a manufacturer may be the same as a
vertical price-fixing arrangement. 39 Similarly, the economic effects of
31

Id. at 104 n.26.

32

476 U.S. 447 (1986).

" Id. at 448-49.
34 Id. at 459.

Id. at 458-59 ("[W]e have been slow to condemn rules adopted by
professional associations as unreasonable per se... and, in general, to extend per se
analysis to restraints imposed in the context of business relationships where the
impact of certain practices is not immediately obvious ....) (citation omitted).
36 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
15

31

Id. at 757.

38

Id. at 762.

39 id.

600

Loyola Consumer Law Review

[Vol. 14: 593

vertical non-price restraints may be the same as vertical price
restraints. 40 The Court felt that inferring an agreement merely from
the existence of price complaints from competing dealers, or even
from the evidence that the termination by the offending dealer was in
response4 to
1 such price complaints, could deter or penalize legitimate
conduct.
The Court faced similar considerations in the decision of
Business Electronic Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.42 The Sharp
Electronics case also involved the termination of a price-cutting
dealer based on complaints from competing dealers. The competing
dealers went so far as to threaten to resign if the manufacturer did not
take action against the offending dealer.43 The Court recognized that
inferring price-fixing based on price comlaints by other distributors
could condemn pro-competitive conduct. In rejecting the use of the
per se rule, the Court emphasized that the term "restraint" as used in
the Sherman Act "refers not to a particular list of agreements, but to a
particular economic consequence. 45 The Court also noted that the
term "restraint of trade" must be dynamic and "not merely the ' static
content that the common law had assigned to the term in 1890. 46
Another case along the same lines is Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., which was a predatory price
case. 47 In Matsushita, Japanese manufacturers of televisions allegedly
conspired over a 20-year period to reduce the price of televisions in
48
the United States and ultimately drive Zenith out of the market.
When the conspiracy began, the largest American producers, Zenith
and RCA, had a combined market share of about 40 percent. 49 The
Court concluded that the allegation of a predatory pricing conspiracy
was implausible. In doing so, the Court was concerned about
committing error in condemning conduct that could be viewed as pro40

Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 762.

41

Id. at 763-64.

42

485 U.S. 717 (1988).

43

Id. at 721.

44id.
45

Id. at 731.

4 Id. at 732.
47 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
41

Id. at 578, 591.

49

Id.

at 591.
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50
competitive - the cutting or lowering of prices.
As noted above, the Court in NCAA recognized that the per se
rule and the Rule of Reason are not always fixed, definable concepts,
and that the application of these rules had to have the flexibility to
adjust to different variations of business conduct. This idea was most
recently addressed in the case of California Dental Ass'n v. FTC,
where an association comprising three-quarters of the dentists in
California agreed to abide by a code of ethics and advisory opinions
interpreting that code. 5 1 The result was to prohibit price advertising
that was false or misleading, that misrepresented the training and
qualifications of dentists, and that made claims regarding the quali 7
of dental care that was not verifiable, such as "painless dentistry.
The FT C treated the restrictions as per se restrictions on price. In the
alternative, it applied a truncated Rule of Reason analysis, under
which it also found the restrictions unlawful.53 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the per se approach, but affirmed the
application of a truncated Rule of Reason analysis.5" The Supreme
Court, however, rejected the truncated Rule of Reason anal ,sis
applied by the Court of Appeals, calling for a fuller analysis. In
doing so, the Court recognized that the "categories of analysis of
anticompetitive effect are less fixed than terms like 'per se,' 'quick
look,' and 'rule of reason' tend to make them appear." 56 The Court
stated that no categorical line could be drawn between the per se rule
and the Rule of Reason, but rather an analysis must be tailored to the
facts:

[T]here is generally no categorical line to be drawn
between restraints that give rise to an intuitively obvious
inference of anticompetitive effect and those that call for
more detailed treatment. What is required, rather, is an
enquiry meet for the case, looking to the circumstances,

Id. at 594 ("[C]utting prices in order to increase business often is the very
essence of competition. Thus, mistaken inferences.. .are especially costly, because
they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.").
5 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
50

52

Id. at 760 & n. 1.

51 Id. at 762-63.
14

Id. at 763-64.

55 Id. at 781.
56

Id. at 779.
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details, and logic of a restraint. The object is to see whether
the experience of the market has been so clear, or
necessarily will be, that a confident conclusion about the
principal tendency of a restriction will follow from a quick
57
(or at least quicker) look, in place of a more sedulous one.
What should these decisions by the United States Supreme
Court over the last twenty-five years contribute to the discussion
concerning changes to the Canadian Competition Act? First, these
decisions teach that any changes to Canada's Competition Act should
avoid "formalistic line drawing." In other words, they should avoid a
methodology whereby the challenged conduct would be categorized
into one or more descriptions of conduct that establish liability
without more. As recognized by the United States Supreme Court in
the cases discussed above, such an approach has the possibility of
committing error, condemning otherwise pro-competitive conduct.
Second, some form of the Rule of Reason analysis should be adopted.
Third, departure from this Rule of Reason standard should be based
only upon demonstrable economic effects.
Fourth, courts should be very cautious about condemning as
per se unlawful restraints in businesses and industries where the
courts have little experience. This was the approach recently taken by
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in United States v.
Microsoft Corp. in regard to the tying claim alleged there. 59 Under
cases such as Jefferson ParishHospital DistrictNo. 2 v. Hyde59 and
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., tying has
been held to be a per se violation of the antitrust laws if there is
market power in the tying product. The District of Columbia Court of
Appeals in the Microsoft case, however, rejected the application of
the per se rule to the tying of Microsoft's web browser to its
operating system, on the ground that the Court did not know enough
about the competitive issues of such tying in the
computer industry to
61
be confident that they would not commit error.
Fifth, a competition law scheme should be cautious in
condemning restraints imposed in business relationships where the
57 Cal. DentalAss'n, 526
58

U.S. at 780-81.
253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

'9 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
504 U.S. 451 (1992).
Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 84 ("There being no close parallel in prior antitrust
cases, simplistic application of per se tying rules carries a serious risk of harm.").
60

61
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economic impact is not obvious. Sixth, a competition law scheme
should also be flexible, applying a sliding scale that would be able to
adjust the analysis to be "meet for the case" as the Supreme Court
said in California Dental. Some initial market analysis may be
appropriate before condemning conduct as per se unlawful, even if
such conduct appears at first blush to fit into categories that had
traditionally been treated as per se. Seventh, the competition law
scheme should be dynamic. It should be prepared to change over time
as more experience develops with a particular type of conduct applied
to a particular industry or new conduct is encountered.
Mr. Gourley recognizes in his report that his draft code may
be overly broad in establishing the categories of conduct that should
be condemned as a per se violation of the Competition Act. 62 He
tempers such a possibility in part by proposing a complete exemption
from antitrust scrutiny for conduct that is ancillary to another
agreement or arrangement whose predominant purpose is to achieve
efficiencies. 63 The recognition that restraints that are ancillary to procompetitive collaborative conduct by competitors should not be
condemned as per se unlawful was first recognized by the courts in
the United States as early as 1898 by the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals in the decision of Judge Taft in United States v. Addyston

62

Gourley Report, supra note 1, at 14.

63

Section 45(4) of the draft code proposed by Mr. Gourley would read as

follows:

(4) Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of an agreement or
arrangement:
(c) or an effect that is ancillary ("ancillary agreement or effect") to
another agreement or arrangement ("principal agreement"), including
an agreement to acquire or lease assets, that was not entered into for a
principal purpose of having an effect set forth in paragraph (1)(a), (b),

(c) or (d), where:
(i) the ancillary agreement or effect is reasonably necessary to give
effect to, or an integral part of, the principal agreement; and
(ii) it was not reasonably foreseeable, at the time that the principal
agreement was entered into, that competition would be substantially
lessened or prevented as a result of the ancillary agreement or effect,
provided, however, that where the predominant purpose of the principal
agreement is to achieve gains in efficiency the parties shall be deemed
to have not entered into such agreement for a principal purpose of
having an effect set forth in paragraph (1)(a), (b), (c) or (d).
Gourley Report, supra note 1, at app. 2.
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Pipe & Steel Co.,64 and more recently by decisions in the influential
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in cases such as Polk Bros., Inc. v.
Forest City Enterprises, Inc.,65 and General Leaseways, Inc. v.
National Truck Leasing Ass 'n. 66 The United States Department of
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have jointly developed
guidelines for collaborative conduct among competitors that adopt a
similar but more restrictive approach

than the courts.

67

The

significant difference between those cases in the United States that
recognize the potential pro-competitive contribution of ancillary
restraints and the approach adopted by Mr. Gourley in his draft code
is that the latter would totally exempt such conduct from antitrust
scrutiny, while the former would merely apply the Rule of Reason.
In conclusion, Mr. Gourley's report suggesting changes to the
Canadian Competition Act has raised some innovative and thoughtful
ideas that contribute significantly to the dialogue in both Canada and
the United States as to the proper standards to be applied in
adjudicating potential antitrust violations. Such a dialogue contributes
to the important goal of the convergence of the world's competition
laws. This dialogue can be further advanced by a careful examination
of the antitrust jurisprudence in the United States, especially the
decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the last twenty-five
years.

64

85 F. 271 (6thCir. 1898).

65 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985) (Judge Easterbrook applied the Rule of Reason

to an ancillary restraint to restrict output because it contributed to the success of the
cooperative venture between competitors that promised greater productivity and
output).
66 744 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1984) (Judge Posner treated the division of markets
among competing full-service truck lessors as per unlawful because it did not
appear to be ancillary to the arguably pro-competitive agreement to provide
reciprocal emergency breakdown service). The author was lead counsel for the
plaintiff in General Leaseways.
67 Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors, issued by the
FTC and the U.S. Department of Justice (Apr. 2000), available at

http://www.ftc.gov/bc/guidline.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2002).

